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Abstract Unauthorized 802.11 wireless access points
(APs), or rogue APs, such as those brought into a cor-
porate campus by employees, pose a security threat as
they may be poorly managed or insufﬁciently secured.
An attacker in the vicinity may easily get onto the inter-
nal network through a rogue AP, bypassing all perime-
ter security measures. Existing detection solutions do
not work well for detecting rogue APs conﬁgured as
routers that are protected by WEP, 802.11 i, or other
security measures. In this paper, we describe a new
rogue AP detection method to address this problem.
Our solution uses a veriﬁer on the internal wired net-
work to send test trafﬁc towards wireless edge, and
uses wireless sniffers to identify rouge APs that relay
the test packets. To quickly sweep all possible rogue
APs, the veriﬁer uses a greedy algorithm to schedule
the channels for the sniffers to listen to. To work with
the encrypted AP trafﬁc, the sniffers use a probabilistic
algorithm that only relies on observed wireless frame
size. Using extensive experiments, we show that the
proposed approach can robustly detect rogue APs with
moderate network overhead. The results also show
that our algorithm is resilient to congested wireless
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channels and has low false positives/negatives in real-
istic environments.
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1 Introduction
An unauthorized 802.11 wireless access point, or rogue
AP, plugged into a corporate network, poses a serious
security threat to enterprise IT systems. Rogue APs are
typically installed by employees in work places for con-
venience and ﬂexibility. Although users could leverage
available security measures, such as Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP) or 802.11 i, to protect their network
communications, such measures may not be consis-
tent with the corporate security policies and they may
be inefﬁcient. For example, researchers have identi-
ﬁed security ﬂaws in both WEP [4] and 802.11 i [9].
In addition, enterprises often have advanced authen-
tication/ﬁrewalling methods and trafﬁc classiﬁcation/
shaping/tracing requirements, which are unlikely con-
sistent with the rogue APs managed by individ-
uals. Thus rogue AP has been identiﬁed as one of the
most critical wireless security vulnerabilities [17].
Several vendors (e.g., Aruba Networks, AirMagnet,
and AirDefense) sell WLAN Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (WIDS) products that can detect various wireless
security threats. These WIDS solutions typically consist
of a set of wireless sniffers that scan airwaves for packet
analysis. These sniffers can be overlaid with APs, mean-
ing that they are strategically deployed as a separate
infrastructure. These sniffers can also be integrated with
APs, meaning that the APs themselves, in addition toMobile Netw Appl
serving wireless clients, also perform IDS functionali-
ties periodically. Researchers have recently proposed
to turn existing desktop computers into wireless sniffers
to further reduce deployment cost while still providing
a reasonable coverage [1].
Detecting rogue APs using wireless sniffers re-
quires that the sniffers listen to all WLAN channels
to detect the presence of APs either sequentially or
non-sequentially using various channel-surﬁng strate-
gies [6]. If a detected AP is not on the authorized list, it
is ﬂagged as a suspect. The detected suspect, however,
may well be a legitimate AP belong to a neighboring
coffee shop or a nearby household. The question then
becomes how to automatically verify whether the sus-
pectAPisactuallyontheenterprisewirednetwork(see
Fig. 1).
A rogue AP may be conﬁgured as a layer-2 switching
device or a layer-3 routing device, while the latter is
more common for off-the-shelf APs. While working
well for detecting layer-2 rogue APs, existing commer-
cial WIDS solutions are not effective to detect layer-
3 APs that is protected by security measures, such as
MAC address ﬁltering, WEP, or 802.11 i [5].
In this paper, we propose a novel solution to accu-
rately detect rogue APs, whether they are protected
or not. In particular, instead of sending test packets
from wireless side (see related work in Section 2),
our solution has a veriﬁer on the wired network that
sends test packets towards the wireless side. Should any
wireless sniffer pick up these special packets, we have
effectively veriﬁed that the suspect AP that relays these
packets is indeed on the internal network and thus is a
rogue AP. The beneﬁts of our approach include passive
AP1
Sniffer
Rogue
AP
AP2
Network A
Network B
AP1 is a legitimate AP in network A. AP2 is
a legitimate AP in network B. The sniffer
detects that AP2 is not on the legitimate
AP list of network A. How can we know
AP2 is not a rogue in network A?
Figure 1 Detecting rogue APs requires automatic differentiating
legitimate APs on other networks from the rogue ones on our
own networks
wireless snifﬁng that does not rely on communication
between sniffers and the suspect APs, which are often
problematic. Our detection mechanism is also accurate
since it involves a proactive conﬁrmation step, and can
return the IP address of the rogue AP so the adminis-
trator can easily locate the AP.
Our approach needs to address two issues for robust
detection. First, we note that a layer-3 rogue AP nor-
mally comes with a network address translation (NAT)
module so that multiple devices can share the same
connection. It is impossible to send test packets directly
to the associated wireless clients, from the wired side,
because they have private IP addresses. We note that
NATrewritesoutboundpacketsfromassociatedclients
with its own address. Thus, we can use the veriﬁer to
monitor the wired trafﬁc and send test packets to the
active sources. If an active source is an AP, the test
packets will be forwarded by NAT and observed by
wireless sniffers. Second, the sniffers may not be able to
recognize test packets by examining the payload if the
AP has enabled encryption. To solve this problem we
devise a probabilistic veriﬁcation algorithm based on a
sequence of packets of speciﬁc sizes.
The contribution of this paper is a novel approach
to detect protected rogue APs acting as layer-3 routers,
which are difﬁcult to detect using existing solutions. We
design an algorithm for the wired veriﬁer and wireless
sniffers to cooperatively verify rogue APs. Using simu-
lations and experiments, we show that the proposed ap-
proach can effectively detect rogue APs in a relatively
short time period with moderate network overhead.
Once a rogue AP is conﬁrmed, the veriﬁer returns its IP
address from which the switch port to that address can
be found and automatically blocked until the rogue is
removed. Our empirical evaluation also shows that the
detection algorithm is resilient to congested wireless
channels.
InthispaperweassumethattheownerofarogueAP
is not malicious: he simply sets up an unauthorized AP
for convenience. The veriﬁer and the wireless sniffers
themselves are guarded by typical security measures,
such as access control mechanisms and intrusion de-
tection systems, against external attackers. In reality, a
malicious rogue AP owner with physical wired access
can do much more damage than setting up a rogue AP.
Coping such insider attacks is beyond the focus of this
paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 summarizes the related work. We present a net-
work model of the problem statement in Section 3.I n
Sections 4 and 5 we describe our monitoring and veriﬁ-
cation algorithms, respectively. We present evaluation
resultsinSection6.WediscusspotentiallimitationsandMobile Netw Appl
scalability improvements of our method in Section 7
and we conclude in Section 8.
2 Related work
Many WLAN security vendors provide some form of
rogue AP detection. A simple mechanism is to compare
the unknown APs, found by the sniffers, with a list of
legitimate APs using their MAC addresses. This may,
however, lead to numerous false positives, classifying
neighboring APs as rogues on the internal network.
One effective approach to verify layer-2 rogue APs,
conﬁgured as switches rather than routers, is to poll
all internal enterprise network switches using SNMP
to collect MAC addresses associated with each port
on those switches. If a wireless sniffer observes any of
these MAC addresses over the air, the associated AP
must be on the wired network, given that the AP works
as a layer-2 bridge. For layer-3 rogue APs, a common
veriﬁcation approach is to have a nearby sniffer actively
associate with the suspect AP and ping a known host
on the internal network not accessible from outside. If
successful, the suspect AP is conﬁrmed to be on the
internal network and is indeed a rogue.
This associate-and-ping approach, however, may
have a sniffer associate with others’ APs and send test-
ing packets through their internal networks. This would
resultinatrespass ofothers’networks,andsoonecould
face ethical and even legal charges. More importantly,
this approach fails to verify protected APs that require
valid MAC addresses or other authentication methods
for successful association. A recent study conﬁrmed
that existing solutions were indeed not adequate for
detecting protected APs that act as routers [5]. Our
proposed solution, on the other hand, can effectively
detect layer-3 protected rogue APs.
RogueScanner by Network Chemistry takes a ﬁn-
gerprinting approach, in which the detector collects
various information from network devices and send it
backtoacentralizedserverforclassiﬁcation.Thisraises
both privacy and security concerns on sending internal
network informationto a third party.This approachhas
to build a large database on device proﬁles and needs
user feedback on any device that is not in the database.
Thus it needs to trust user-input data not to poison their
database in a malicious or unintentional way.
DIAR proposes three more types of tests besides
active association, leading to perhaps a most compre-
hensive solution for rogue AP detection [1]. First, one
can use MAC address test that requires compiling a list
of known MAC addresses on the corporate networks,
but it only works for link-layer APs. Second, one can
run DHCP test to identify device OS types using signa-
tures from DHCP requests, which only works for APs
conﬁgured to use DHCP. Finally, the wireless sniffers
can replay some captured packets and see whether any
wired monitor can detect these packets. DIAR uses
several heuristics to reduce false alarms, though the
details and results are not presented in its publications.
Their approach can bypass encryption problem but
require running a wired monitor in each subnet. On
the other hand, we aim to run only one veriﬁer for
monitoring (see Section 7).
If we know the precise location of a detected AP, we
can determine that it is a rogue if it is located inside the
enterprise. Existing WLAN localization algorithms can
achieve 3–5 m accuracy [2], but they typically require
extensive manual proﬁling to build RF maps and thus
is not realistic to deploy on any large campus.
Wei et al. propose an interesting approach that
uses timing information of TCP-ACK pairs to classify
whether a source is wireless or wired (Ethernet) [20,
21], which can be used to detect rogue APs. Their idea
is that two consecutively sent packets, such as TCP
ACKs, will likely have longer time intervals between
them after they traverse through a 802.11 link than
through Ethernet. We note, however, that these pack-
ets may be queued by a busy router, thus destroying the
timing interval information and resulting in inaccurate
analysis. In near future, as 802.11 n APs become more
popularandtheirbandwidthiscomparableto100Mbps
Ethernet, making the time interval information less
useful.
We performed experiments for quantitative demon-
stration. We set up a Linksys WRT54G AP that con-
nected a wired sender A that sent three continuous
TCP packets to a wireless receiver B every second. On
A we measured the two intervals between the three
continuous ACKs received from B. We connected an-
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Figure 2 Time intervals between TCP-ACK pairs (the bars are
slightly shifted horizontally to avoid overlaps)Mobile Netw Appl
other two wired clients C and D to the AP and gen-
erated trafﬁc between them to make the AP “busy.”
Figure 2 shows the average time intervals of the ACK
pairs. The x axis is the rate of packet transmissions
between C and D through the AP. The larger the rate
is, the busier the AP is. The y axis is the average
time intervals between ACKs and the bars represent
25% and 75% percentiles. The time intervals of ACK
pairs when using 802.11g decreased below the 600μs
threshold used in [21], thus this wireless AP may be
classiﬁed as a wired source. Also, the time intervals of
ACK pairs using 802.11 g are much smaller than those
using slower 802.11 b. This suggests that as even faster
wireless technologies, such as 802.11 n, are deployed,
timing-based detection methods may have further dif-
ﬁculties to differentiate wired and wireless sources.
On the other hand, our method employs a veriﬁcation
procedure to determine whether a source is actually
wireless or not by leveraging wireless sniffers and is
agnostic to wireless trafﬁc variations.
3 Network model
We assume that wireless sniffers are deployed to mon-
itor the enterprise airspace. The sniffers employ some
channel-hopping strategies to detect the presence of
APs. These APs may be using different communica-
tion channels. The sniffers are connected to the wired
network and can communicate with an internal veriﬁer.
The sniffers update the veriﬁer about the detected APs
and their channels. The veriﬁer may instruct certain
sniffers to switch to a particular channel during the
veriﬁcation process. Figure 3 shows a simpliﬁed net-
work where sniffer S1 covers multiple APs, and sniffers
S1 and S2 have overlapping coverage. C1 and C2 are
wireless stations.
Verifier
S2
S1
AP1 AP2
C2 C1
Figure 3 A simpliﬁed network model with APs and sniffers
A rogue AP could be a layer-2 device or a layer-3
device. While our approach works for both cases, we
will focus on layer-3 devices, which are most common
for consumer APs. A layer-3 AP typically comes with
NAT and each associated wireless clients is assigned
with a private IP address. When a client communicates
with a wired host with address Aout and port number
Pout, NAT opens a special port on itself (Pnat)a n d
rewrites the headers of outbound packets so they look
like as if they are coming from its own address Anat
and port Pnat. At this time, any packet from Aout and
Pout that are sent to Anat and Pnat will be forwarded
by NAT to the wireless client, thus appearing on the
wireless medium and observable by sniffers in range.
NAT ports are opened dynamically when clients ini-
tiate communications with outside destinations. Thus,
the veriﬁer needs to monitor outbound trafﬁc and send
test packets to the sources Asrc and Psrc.T h et e s t
packets, however, need to have forged headers to look
like as if they are coming from Aout and Pout.I ti s
fairly easy to use existing tools to send packets with
customized headers. If some of the sniffers report re-
ception of these packets, Asrc must be the IP address of
a rogue AP. Based on the network topology, switches’
ARP tables, and possibly DHCP logs, it is feasible to
track down exactly which switch port the rogue AP is
plugged into.
Note that the veriﬁer essentially injects spoofed
packets into a normal communication path. We need
to be careful what types of packets to inject without
disrupting normal communication. TCP packets have
a sequence number (SN) header ﬁeld to ensure reli-
able data transfer. The receiver maintains a window
rcv_wnd and only accepts packets whose SN falling
into that window. Thus, the veriﬁer should inject test
packets with forged SN set to be outside that window,
such as an SN the receiver has recently acknowledged.
The receiver will then silently drop these test packets.
Ontheotherhand,UDPpacketsdonothavetransport-
layer SN and all packets will be forwarded to the ap-
plication layer. To avoid confusing applications using
UDP, we refrain from injecting UDP test packets and
the veriﬁer only monitors TCP trafﬁc in this paper. In
practice, common UDP-based multimedia applications
are fairly resilient to distorted content, thus our method
may still be applicable.
4 Wired trafﬁc monitoring
The veriﬁer monitors wired trafﬁc. Every observed host
on the internal network is potentially a wireless AP, un-
less explicitly marked by administrators as wired, suchMobile Netw Appl
as the IP addresses of the well-known network servers.
All addresses allocated to user workstations, however,
should be considered susceptible, since a user could
conﬁgure an AP to use the static IP address assigned
to her workstation when DHCP is not available.
Verifying a host takes a certain amount of time
for sniffers to switch channels and analyze observed
packets (Section 5). If there is a burst of new sources
observed in a short period, these sources are queued
by the veriﬁer and tested sequentially. The veriﬁer
always picks the host with the oldest timestamp for
veriﬁcation. All hosts in the queue will be updated with
new timestamp if more trafﬁc from them is observed.
The NAT port, however, could expire for being idle for
too long when the veriﬁer tests a source that has been
waiting in the queue for a while. The veriﬁer will skip
testing any source that has not been updated for certain
amount of time, say 5 min, to avoid sending trafﬁc to an
invalid port number. These sources will be tested next
time when their trafﬁc is observed.
It is possible to further reduce network load if the
veriﬁer can tell, based on trafﬁc patterns, whether the
observed hosts are likely connected to a wireless link.
Wei et. al studied the timing patterns of the packet
intervals over wireless and wired links [20, 21], which
are quite different since wireless links generally have
less bandwidth and 802.11 MAC requires a random
backoff between two consecutive packets [8].
We want to ﬁnd an online algorithm for the veriﬁer
to quickly classify observed hosts, so that the veriﬁer
can focus only on testing those classiﬁed as wireless
sources. If the classiﬁcation is 100% accurate, then the
veriﬁer do not need to take further actions. All exist-
ing timing-based classiﬁcation algorithms, however, are
prone to false positivesandfalse negativesas we discuss
in Section 2. Inspired by Wei et al’s work [20], we chose
to simply count the short packet intervals, i.e., less
than 250μs, between TCP packets of both inbound and
outbound directions. The veriﬁer classiﬁes any source,
whose ratio of inbound and outbound short intervals
exceeds a threshold, as a potential wireless host. The
reason of doing so is that the number of outbound short
intervals, observed after packets having gone through a
wireless link, is expected to be much smaller than the
inbound number of short intervals, observed before the
packets reaching the AP. This simple method is faster
to compute, but may classify some wired hosts as wire-
less sources. The returned list of suspect IP addresses
is then further veriﬁed by the algorithm discussed in
Section 5.
In summary, the veriﬁer may test every observed
internal host or only test those hosts classiﬁed as wire-
less sources. The ﬁrst approach is straightforward to
implement.The classiﬁcation can reduce test trafﬁc, but
it may also lead to inaccurate results. In both cases,
a veriﬁed non-rogue address will not be tested for
some time, after which it becomes susceptible again
and is subject for veriﬁcation. The reason for periodic
testing is because a rogue AP can be installed using a
previously-veriﬁed IP address at any time. Similarly, a
wireless source mistakenly classiﬁed as wired will also
be tested again after previous veriﬁcation is expired.
We evaluate these two methods in Section 6.
5 Rogue AP veriﬁcation
The veriﬁer sends test packets to observed sources and
check whether some wireless sniffers can hear these
packets. But a rogue AP may encrypt trafﬁc and so
sniffers cannot rely on special signatures embedded
in the application-layer data. One may borrow ideas
from covert channels, in which the veriﬁer deliberately
manipulate the timing between packets without
injecting any new packets. The packet intervals thus
carry unique information, sometimes called watermark,
which can be identiﬁed by a passive sniffer [19]. While
not intrusive, this approach seems less appealing in a
wireless environment because 802.11 MAC contention
delays could affect accuracy of this timing-based
analysis. Also, it requires customizing routers on the
data path, which is a non-trivial task and could degrade
routing performance.
Another approach is to send a sequence of packets
whose size follows some predeﬁned pattern that is un-
likely observed in normal trafﬁc, such as “1 2 4 8 16.”
The wireless sniffers, however, may not capture all the
packets due to transient losses. Other packets may also
mix into the sequence when the packets go through
shared queues and wireless media. These limitations
make this approach less robust.
5.1 Packet size selection
We present a new solution. In particular, we use a
veriﬁer on the wired network to send test packets with
sizes not frequently seen on the suspect APs. Namely,
the sniffers report empirical distribution of packet sizes
observed from APs to the veriﬁer, which then selects an
uncommon size for test packets. This simple approach
has an implicit assumption that sizes of the downstream
packets from APs are not uniformly distributed. We
analyzed a network trace collected from a WLAN
made available to attendees of a four-day academic
conference (Sigcomm 2004) [15]. Figure 4a shows the
PDF of one AP’s downstream data packet sizes (theMobile Netw Appl
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Figure 4 Size distribution of downstream data packets (a, b)
injected test packets will appear as 802.11 data packets
on wireless). It is clear that most packet sizes appear
infrequently. Figure 4b shows the results for an AP
deployed at a university campus, and again we can
see that almost half of downstream data packets have
packet size of 110 bytes.
In general, we want to choose a relatively small
packet size so that the veriﬁer demands less bandwidth.
Also, a small packet will unlikely be fragmented by
APs and thus will not be missed by sniffers. Once a
size is chosen, the veriﬁer notiﬁes the sniffers to only
watch for packets with this particular size. To get a
frame size N, the veriﬁer should send out TCP packets
with application payload of N minus the size of all the
protocol headers captured by the sniffer. Note that the
sniffer should also consider the overhead of encrypted
packets. For example, there are additional 12 bytes
overhead for WEP packets (3 bytes IV, 1 byte key
number, and two 4-bytes ICVs).
Suppose that the two geographically close APs in
Fig. 3 belong to two companies, where S1 may overhear
the test packets from the other AP if the veriﬁcation
processes occur simultaneously in these two networks.
In this case, S1 may falsely conclude that another com-
pany’s AP is a rogue. To mitigate this problem, the
veriﬁer chooses randomly a packet size from the M
least observed packet sizes on the network, minimizing
the chance of colliding veriﬁcation time and test packet
size.
5.2 Binary hypothesis testing
To avoid false positives caused by normal packets that
happen to have the same size of the test packets, the
veriﬁer sends more than one test packet to improve
the robustness of detection. The question is how many
test packets the veriﬁer should send. Note that we may
not observe a back-to-back packet train of the same
size, because normal packets of different sizes may be
inserted as the test packets going through the shared
wirelessmedium.TheAPsmayalsosendotherpackets,
suchasbeacons,inthemiddleofatestpacketsequence.
We use Sequential Hypothesis Testing theory to
determine the number of test packets that can achieve
desired detection accuracy [18]. Assume that the prob-
ability to see data packets with the chosen test size s
from a monitored AP is p, and the sniffers determine
independently whether the AP is relaying test packets
based on observed downstream trafﬁc. Intuitively, the
more packets with the test size are observed, the more
likelyaveriﬁcationisinprocessandtherelayingAPisa
rogue. For a given AP being monitored by some sniffer,
let Xi be a random variable that represents the size of
ith downstream data packet, where
Xi =

0, if the packet size  = s
1, if the packet size = s
We consider two hypotheses, H0 and H1,w h e r eH0
statesthatthe monitoredAP is notrelayingtestpackets
(thus not a rogue), and H1 states that the AP is relaying
test packets (thus a rogue). Assume that the random
variables Xi|Hj are independent and uniformly distrib-
uted, conditional on the hypothesis Hj. We express the
distribution of Xi as below:
Pr[Xi = 0|H0]=θ0, Pr[Xi = 1|H0]=1 − θ0
Pr[Xi = 0|H1]=θ1, Pr[Xi = 1|H1]=1 − θ1
We can specify the detection performance using the
detection probability, PD, and the false positive prob-
ability, PF. In particular, we can choose desired values
for α and β so that
PF ≤ α and PD ≥ β (1)
where typical values might be α = 0.01 and β = 0.99.Mobile Netw Appl
The goal of the veriﬁcation algorithm is to determine
which hypothesis is true while satisfying the perfor-
mance condition (1). Following [18], as each packet is
observed we calculate the likelihood ratio as follows:
 (X) =
Pr[X|H1]
Pr[X|H0]
=
n 
i=1
Pr[Xi|H1]
Pr[Xi|H0]
(2)
where X is the vector of events (packet size is s or
not) observed so far and Pr[X|Hi] represents the con-
ditional probability mass function of the event stream
X given that model Hj is true. The likelihood ratio is
then compared to an upper threshold, η1,a n dalower
threshold, η0.I f (X) ≤ η0 then we accept hypothesis
H0.I f (X) ≥ η1 then we accept hypothesis H1.I f
η0 <  ( X)<η 1 then we wait for the next observation
and update  (X). These two thresholds can be upper
and lower bounded by simple expressions of PF and
PD (η1 =
β
α and η0 =
1−β
1−α), from which we can compute
theexpectednumberofobservationsneededbeforethe
veriﬁcation algorithm accepts one hypothesis [11]:
E[N|H0]=
αln
β
α + (1 − α)ln
1−β
1−α
θ0ln
θ1
θ0 + (1 − θ0)ln
1−θ1
1−θ0
E[N|H1]=
βln
β
α + (1 − β)ln
1−β
1−α
θ1ln
θ1
θ0 + (1 − θ1)ln
1−θ1
1−θ0
(3)
Given a suspect AP, θ0 can be empirically calculated
by sniffers. The veriﬁer injects a sequence of test pack-
ets of the same size, producing a new probability θ1.
Given desired performance conditions α and β (Eq. 1),
we can establish how θ1 relates to the number of ob-
servations needed (Eq. 3) for the veriﬁer to accept H0
or H1 (deciding whether the AP is a rogue or not).
Figure 5a shows that we want to choose packet size with
small probability appearing on normal communications
(1 − θ0) to reduce the number of observations. It also
shows a tradeoff for θ1, for the veriﬁer needs to inject
more packets for smaller θ1 and thus yielding quicker
algorithm termination.
The number of test packets relates to the current
load of the monitored AP. If the rate of downstream
data packets is measured as R, the veriﬁer needs
to inject R/2 test packets to bring θ1 to about 0.7.
Fortunately, R is often small, particularly for rogue
APs, so the veriﬁer does not have to send a large
number of test packets. We computed the number (and
the total bytes) of downstream data packets of an AP
deployed in our department over an 8.5-h period in
the afternoon. The load on that AP was fairly light
and most of the time the R is less than 10 packets per
second and the bandwidth usage is less than 8 Kbps
(Fig. 5b).
5.3 Sniffer channel scheduling
Wireless sniffers scan through all possible channels to
detect suspect APs that are not listed as legitimate APs
on the monitored network. A suspect AP, however,
could either be a rogue on the monitored network or
a legitimate AP on a nearby network.
After suspect APs are identiﬁed, the veriﬁer sends
test packets to target IP addresses, identiﬁed using
methods in Section 4, to see whether the suspect APs
relay these test packets. In particular, the veriﬁer in-
structs the sniffers in the proximity of the suspect APs
to monitor all possible channels and report to the ver-
iﬁer. If one of these sniffers on a particular channel
detects that test packets are being relayed from the
suspect AP to a wireless client, the veriﬁer conﬁrms
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that the suspect AP is indeed a rogue on the monitored
network.
A sniffer can listen to multiple APs if they are in
its range, even if they operate on different channels.
A sniffer, however, can only listen to one channel at
a time, and so it has to switch to different channels to
monitor other APs in its range. For example, if there is
only one sniffer s1 in Fig. 3 and the two APs, operating
on different channels, are within the range of s1,t h e n
s1 can cover both APs sequentially, for it has to be
tuned to a different channel. Thus, for every source
veriﬁcation, the veriﬁer needs to repeat the test packets
when scheduling sniffers over different channels.
Assume that there are N suspect APs and M sniffers.
We label a suspect AP by i and a sniffer by j,w h e r e
1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ j ≤ M. We call a suspect AP a target.
Each target i transmits on a channel ci, which could
be any integer between 1 and Cmax, the maximum
number of channels available. For example, Cmax = 11
for 802.11 b.
Note that wireless sniffers are typically assigned for
continuous performance and security monitoring [1,
16], which will be interrupted as we schedule them for
rogue AP veriﬁcation. Thus ideally we want to reduce
thenumberofsniffersinvolvedforveriﬁcationpurpose,
but still to cover all suspect APs.
Weuse Sj todenotethesetoftargetsthatcanbecov-
ered by sniffer j. We want to use the smallest number of
sniffers to cover all targets. This is equivalent to solving
the minimum set cover problem, which is known to
be NP-hard (see, e.g. [7]). The following greedy algo-
rithm ﬁnds in polynomial time an approximation to the
problem with an approximation guarantee of Hd (see,
e.g. [10]), where Hd =
d
 =1 1/  is the d-th harmonic
number and d is the cardinality of the largest set of
targets that can be covered by a sniffer.
Algorithm A
1. Set C ←∅ ; S1
j = Sj, 1 ≤ j ≤ M; I ←{ 1,2,...,N};
  ← 0.
2. Set   ←   + 1. Select Sj  such that |S  
j |=
max1≤j≤M |S  
j |.
3. Set C ← C ∪{j }, S
 +1
j ← S  
j − S  
j ,a n dI ← I −
S  
j .
4. If I =∅ , stop and output C. Otherwise go to Step 1.
Ontheotherhand,asniffermayhavetoswitchchan-
nels to cover all nearby APs. We want to reduce the
number of channels a sniffer has to switch to, since the
veriﬁer needs to repeat testing packets for every new
channel. This can be achieved by coordinate nearby
sniffers to reduce the maximum number of channels
any sniffer has to check.
Thus we need a new algorithm to minimize the num-
ber of channel switching, in addition to minimizing the
number of sniffers. Minimizing the number of sniffers
and minimizing the number of channel switching, how-
ever, are two competitive objectives. This is because
using less number of sniffers could increase the number
of channel switching, and using less number of channel
switching could in turn increase the number of sniffers.
Thus,we considerthe sum ofthenumberofsniffersand
the number of channel switching and try to minimize
this summation. This problem contains minimum set
cover as a special case (when there is only one ﬁxed
channel available, e.g.) and so it is NP-hard. Similar to
Algorithm A, we present a linear-time approximation
algorithm for this problem.
We use an integer k to label channels, where 1 ≤
k ≤ Cmax.L e tSjk denote the set of targets operated
on channel k that fall in the range of sniffer j,w h e r e
1 ≤ j ≤ M and 1 ≤ k ≤ Cmax. Note that Sjk for some k
may be empty. Remove these Sjk from consideration.
For convenience, in what follows we assume that Sjk is
not empty.
Let J denote the set of sniffers j and I the set of
targets i detected by some j at a certain channel k.
Algorithm A 
1. Set C ←∅ ; S1
jk = Sjk;   ← 0.
2. Set   ←   + 1. Select Sj k  such that |S  
j  k |=
maxj∈J |S  
jk|.S e ts  ← j  and c  ← k .
3. Set C ← C ∪{j }; S
 +1
jk ← S  
jk− S  
j k ,a n dI ← I −
S  
j  .
4. If I ←∅ , stop and output C. Otherwise go to Step
1.
Let r be the value of   when Algorithm A  stops.
At the  -th round for 1 ≤   ≤ r, the veriﬁer schedules
sniffer s  to listen to channel c .
It is straightforward to see that Algorithm A  runs in
O(

j,k |Sjk|) time. Let d = max{|S jk||j ∈ J and 1 ≤
k ≤ Cmax}. Then Algorithm A  produces an approxima-
tion with an approximation ratio of Hd.
Remark If we want to give priority to minimizing the
number sniffers, then in Step 2 of Algorithm A ,w e
could select Sj k  such that j  has been selected in
previous iteration if more than one pair (j ,k ) that
satisﬁes the condition in Step 2.Mobile Netw Appl
6 Evaluation results
In this section we present experimental results of our
detection method. We ﬁrst evaluate wired trafﬁc mon-
itoring methods using extensive network traces. We
then evaluate the sniffer channel scheduling algorithm
using two real-world AP databases. We quantify the
impact of congested channels on the performance of
packet snifﬁng and show the accuracy and speed results
for our detection algorithm. Finally, we present detec-
tion accuracy using empirical AP traces.
6.1 Wired trafﬁc monitoring
The veriﬁer monitors wired trafﬁc and test internal
addresses. The premise of this approach is that the
veriﬁcation load could be amortized over time. To
evaluate this approach, we need extensive long-term
network traces. Unfortunately, we do not have such
kind of data from real enterprise networks. Instead, we
use traces collected from Dartmouth campus WLAN as
a baseline evaluation. These traces only contain trafﬁc
from and to wireless hosts. We took two 10-day data
sets collected in November 2003, one collected from
APs in a library building and the other collected from
APs in a residential hall. There are more than 1200
unique IP addresses in each trace. We scan each trace
chronically, where in 75% of the cases the time needed
to observe a previously unseen address is greater than
100 s.
We simulated the veriﬁer to test every host (IP
address) in these two traces. We used 30 s as a fairly
conservative value for the time needed to verify a
source (in practice, a veriﬁcation only needs a couple
of seconds when the maximum number of channels
checked by any sniffer is small). Thus, a total of 120
hosts can be veriﬁed in an hour. When the veriﬁer
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Figure 6 Length of veriﬁcation queue (campus WLAN)
was testing an address, all newly arrived hosts were
queued. Any newly arrived packet from a queued host
would pull that host to the end of the queue and the
veriﬁer always picked the head of the queue when it
started next veriﬁcation. If the host to be veriﬁed had
not generated any packets for 5 min, the veriﬁer would
simply ignore it to avoid sending test packets to an
expired NAT port number.
Figure 6 shows how the length of veriﬁcation queue
changed over 10 days. The length of both queues had
never exceeded 20. The queues, however, did have
somehostsremaininguntested,roughly6forthelibrary
trace and 10 for the residential trace. This means that
there were some hosts that appeared early in the trace,
expired in the queue before they could be veriﬁed, and
were never seen again (so no more trafﬁc triggering
veriﬁcation). Most likely this is an artifact caused by
device mobility. For example, some guests may have
used wireless when visiting the library or the dorm, but
then left the campus and thus was not seen again in our
10-day traces.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the veriﬁcation
delay since the ﬁrst time a request was observed from
a host. In more than 98% of the cases a host could be
veriﬁed within 5 min since its ﬁrst appearance. A few
hosts were not veriﬁed after a couple of days, most
likely when these mobile hosts visited the monitored
APs again. We also found that in more than 95%
and 99% of the cases a host could be veriﬁed within
50 s since its last update for the library and residential
traces, respectively. These results suggest that the veri-
ﬁer worked effectively for a moderate-size network.
While the Dartmouth trace is a long-term trace, it
only consists of wireless hosts and does not represent
a typical enterprise where many hosts are wired. So
we took a one-day enterprise network trace presented
in [13], and merged the data sets collected from oddly
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Figure 8 Length of veriﬁcation queue (enterprise LAN)
and evenly numbered router ports to produce two time-
continuous traces. We then considered each trace em-
ulating a veriﬁer that monitors a port for 1 h, moves
on to the next port for another hour, and so on. We
found that in about 46% or 66% of the cases the time
intervals needed to observe a new host are less than
10 s. We expect that the intervals would be larger if we
had longer-time traces from the same router ports.
Figure 8 shows the change of the veriﬁcation queue
length. As expected, the queue length jumped and then
gradually decreased as the veriﬁer moved to a new port.
This pattern is quite visible for the even-port trace. At
the 6th hour of the odd-port trace, the monitor started
on an active subnet and 539 hosts were observed during
that hour. Many of these hosts could not be veriﬁed in
time during this period and they stayed in the queue.
We observed a similar pattern at the 10th hour for
another busy subnet. We note that once the monitor
cycles through these ports, the queued hosts will be
veriﬁed once the monitor visits previous ports again.
Figure 9 shows the distribution of the veriﬁcation
delay since the ﬁrst time a request was observed from
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Figure 9 Veriﬁcation delay since ﬁrst request (enterprise LAN)
a host. For those hosts that were veriﬁed, 77% of them
were veriﬁed within 20 min since their ﬁrst appearance
for both traces. Also, 49% of them were veriﬁed within
100 s since their last update. For all these tests, the
veriﬁer could achieve even faster speed if it could test a
source quicker than 30 s.
Note that the veriﬁer could reduce its workload
by only testing likely wireless sources (Section 4). To
evaluate this approach, we set up a Linksys AP (model
WRT 54G), conﬁgured to use 802.11 b, which was
plugged into our department network mimicking a
rogue AP. One of the author’s laptop used that AP
as the main network connection whenever the author
was in his ofﬁce. The Web browser on that laptop was
conﬁgured to use a Web proxy running tcpdump to
collect the HTTP trafﬁc. Thus, all the Web transactions
from that laptop went through the AP and the Web
proxy, recorded in the tcpdump trace. Then we ran
the classiﬁcation algorithm through this trace to see
whether we could classify the IP address of the AP
as wireless. While we only had one trace, we started
classiﬁcation at different time in the trace. We got
total 667 classiﬁcation over a 14-day trace with 30-min
separation. Our classiﬁer achieved 100% accuracy and
Fig. 10 shows the distribution of how long the classiﬁer
took to make a decision since it saw the ﬁrst request. In
about 93% of the cases the classiﬁer could conclude in
less than 100 s.
Another question is whether the classiﬁer can cor-
rectly identify the wired sources to avoid testing them
further. We ran the classiﬁcation over the previous
one-day enterprise network traces, where 568 unique
IP addresses were classiﬁed as wireless and 227 were
classiﬁed as wired. The median time to classify a wire-
less and a wired source is 86 and 476 s, respectively.
While we do not have the ground truth to tell the
accuracy of the classiﬁcation over this trace, it is likely,
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assuming most of the enterprise hosts are wired, that
the algorithm had correctly classiﬁed about 30% of
wired hosts and thus could reduce testing trafﬁc signiﬁ-
cantly. It is feasible to further reduce the testing load by
using more sophisticated statistical testing algorithms,
which require training data sets to ﬁne tune detection
thresholds [20, 21].
6.2 Sniffer channel scheduling
Here we evaluate the sniffer channel scheduling algo-
rithm. Ideally we want to use fewest sniffers to cover
all the suspect APs. A sniffer can only tune into dif-
ferent channels sequentially, so we also want to have
minimum number of channel tuning to speed up the
veriﬁcation.
We used two empirical AP databases to evaluate
scheduling efﬁciency. One database contains the coor-
dinates of APs identiﬁed by wardriving Seattle down-
town area conducted by Placelab.1 We took 200 APs
in a 500 × 500 m2 area, though there are no channel
numbers listed for these APs in the database. We as-
sumed that they could either be a 802.11 b/g or 802.11
a AP and we randomly assigned each AP a channel
from 24 available channels (11 in 802.11 b/g and 13 in
802.11a).Theotherdatabasecontainsbothcoordinates
and channel number of APs deployed on Dartmouth
campus and we again took 400 APs located in a 500 ×
500 m2 area. Dartmouth APs use both 802.11 b/g and
802.11 a and only occupy 12 orthogonal 2.4 GHz/5 GHz
channels in total.
We set the sniffer’s monitoring range to be 100 m,
and virtually deployed a random number of sniffers
(from 1 to the number of APs). The scheduling algo-
rithm was run over 10,000 topologies (T, S),w h e r eT is
the set of APs that have at least one sniffer covering it,
and S is the set of sniffers that cover at least one AP.
Note that T can be smaller than the number of APs if
some APs are not covered by any sniffers for a given
topology.
Figure 11 shows the ratio of the number of scheduled
sniffers to the number of total sniffers (S). The x axis
is S/T, the density of sniffers, which has a bucket size
of 0.1. For example, the y of x = 0.5 is the average
of scheduled sniffer ratios for all x in (0.4,0.5]. Max-
Chan is the maximum number of channels used by
the APs (Seattle wardriving APs used all 24 available
channels while Dartmouth managed APs used 12). Not
surprisingly, the results show that the ratio of needed
sniffers decreases as the sniffer density increases (more
1http://www.placelab.org/database/.
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Figure 11 Number of scheduled sniffers
sniffers are collaborating for AP coverage). If there are
more channels an AP can choose from, more sniffers
are needed to cover them. In the context of enterprise
WLAN deployment, usually there are more sniffers
than suspect APs, which commonly are conﬁgured to 3
non-overlapping channels in 2.4 GHz. This means only
a small number of sniffers are needed to cover these
APs.
Figure 12 shows the maximum number of channels
to be checked across all sniffers. The x axis is the ratio
of the scheduled sniffers to total sniffers S, which has
a bucket size of 0.1. The y axis is the average of all
maximum number of channels to check for all (x −
0.1,x]. The larger the maximum number of channels,
the longer it takes to ﬁnish each veriﬁcation for one
source. The results clearly show the tradeoff between
the number of needed sniffers and the maximum num-
ber of channels. If we can coordinate more sniffers, the
veriﬁcation process runs faster. Note that we normally
do not want to use all sniffers, which run continuous
trafﬁc monitoring tasks [1, 16]. It is thus the network
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Figure 12 Maximum number of channels to checkMobile Netw Appl
operator’s decision on how many sniffers can be inter-
rupted for veriﬁcation.
6.3 Impact of congested channels
Wireless sniffers are typically embedded devices with
limited resources. They usually have 200–300 MHz
CPU and 16–32 MB RAM, running tailored Linux,
such as OpenWRT, and supporting open-source wire-
less drivers, such as MadWiﬁ. We note that the packet
snifﬁng program, running in Linux’s user space, often
cannot capture all frames in the air because of long
distance to the transmitter, multi-path collisions, and
more importantly, the congested channels. The snifﬁng
software uses PCAP library for frame capture, and
the PCAP runs in Linux kernel and maintains its own
buffer for captured frames from a radio interface. If the
channel is congested with a large number of wireless
frames, the PCAP will drop incoming frames from
the radio, as its buffer becomes full and the snifﬁng
program falls behind on processing the frames in the
buffer.
To quantify the effect of the congested channel on
frame capture, we set up an Asus AP and a “jammer”
who constantly injects wireless frames into the air using
the ﬁle2air utility. Note that the jammer still follows
802.11 MAC protocol. A wired workstation (WS) pe-
riodically sent UDP packets to a wireless station (STA)
associated with our AP. We placed two sniffers, one
is about 3 ft to the AP and the other is about 30 ft to
the AP. On each sniffer, we recorded how many frames
captured by the radio, using an open-source MadWiﬁ
utility, and how many frames captured by our snifﬁng
program. Thus we can calculate the frame-loss rate by
the sniffer, averaged over 20 tests. Figure 13 shows
that the snifﬁng program lost more than 70% and 80%
frames captured by the radio on the two sniffers, as the
jammer injects 200 frames per second into the air. The
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Figure 14 Test UDP packet loss rate at sniffers and the receiving
station
loss rate clearly increases as the channel becomes more
congested.
We also calculated the loss rate of UDP packets sent
by the WS. On the sniffers, we can decode wireless
frames, which are any frames in the air, to determine
whether they are UDP packets sent by the WS. On the
STA, it is straightforward to compute the number of
received UDP packets since it is the intended receiver
of the WS. Figure 14 shows that the UDP loss rate was
signiﬁcant on sniffers, which is not surprising given the
poor capturing capability of the snifﬁng program on
congested channels. On the other hand, the UDP loss
rate on intended receiver STA was signiﬁcantly lower.
The difference here is that the STA’s radio, not acting
in the snifﬁng mode, will ﬁlter out all frames that are
not destinated to itself. This hardware-based ﬁltering is
efﬁcient and allows the OS and the UDP receiver to
have little workload compared with the sniffers, whose
radio has to pass all frames to the OS. These results
conﬁrm that the frame loss is caused by the sniffers,
rather than the wireless channel.
Previous experiments show that sniffers can lose
many frames on congested channels. This implies that
the test packets sent by the rogue AP veriﬁer may not
be received appropriately by the sniffers. The question
is then how well the proposed detection algorithm still
works on a congested channel.
We performed additional experiments. On the WS,
we ran a workload generator that sent 20 UDP packets
per second to the associated STA. These UDP packets
were generated in such a way that the probability of
a UDP packet having a size of 20 bytes is 5%. Then
our veriﬁer periodically sends 20-byte test packets with
rate R packets per second (pps), under different con-
gestion level controlled by the jamming device. For
every R and a congestion level, we repeated the test
for 10 times and we calculated the average numberMobile Netw Appl
of frames needed to be observed before our detection
algorithm can make a decision (Section 5.2). Note that
these frames are not arbitrary wireless frames captured
from the air; they are downstream data frames from a
particular AP we are verifying.
The results show that the proposed veriﬁcation al-
gorithm reliably decided that the relaying AP was a
rogue for all tests we performed, though it needed
different number of frames under different network
setup. Figure 15 shows that in general the sniffer needs
to observe more frames to conclude when the channel
wasmorecongested,orwhenlesstestpacketsweresent
by the veriﬁer. It captured about 350 frames, a mixture
of workload and test packets, before it reported that
the AP was a rogue under congestion of 200 injected
frames per second (note that this will cause about 65%
UDP packet loss at sniffers as shown in Fig. 14). The
faster the veriﬁer can inject test packets (larger R),
the quicker the detection algorithms can terminate with
positive results. Here all reports were true positives
and we study false positives and false negatives in next
subsection.
These experiments show that our detection algo-
rithm is resilient even if the channel is heavily con-
gested,causingthesnifferstolosepackets.Ontheother
hand,there are otherreasonsthata sniffermaylose test
packets sent by the veriﬁer. For example, an attacker
can launch various denial of service attacks [3] or abuse
802.11 MAC protocol for cheating attacks [14]. The
consideration of these attacks is out of the scope of
this paper,and we assume a wireless intrusion detection
system, such as MAP [16], is deployed for this purpose.
6.4 Accuracy of rogue AP veriﬁcation
In order to evaluate the accuracy of rogue AP veri-
ﬁcation, we collected a 7-day trace from a residential
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Figure 15 Data frames needed before the detection algorithm
can make a decision
AP, regularly used by 4 wireless devices. We captured
ﬁrst 300 bytes of every packet, resulting in a 3.5 GB
trace ﬁle. First we studied detection false positives,
which are possible when we inject test packets with
size s and there are also s-size packets appeared in
normal AP trafﬁc (not injected) during veriﬁcation.
Thus the sniffer is misled to report that the target AP
is relaying testing packets, resulting in false positives.
We conducted 200 tests over this trace, in each test we
ﬁrst observed 5 min AP trafﬁc and then pick an unseen
packet size in that 5 min to be the size of test packets.
The packet size was randomly picked to be less than
a maximum size (a controllable parameter). Here we
assume that this AP is not a rogue and will not relay
testpackets,henceanyroguereportsarefalsepositives.
The veriﬁer started after the 5-min period and would
stop if detection algorithm terminated with rogue or
not reports or if timed out (threshold t), concluding that
the AP was not a rogue if there was no report from the
sniffer after some time test packets were sent.
Table 1 shows the accuracy of rogue AP veriﬁcation
for certain test packet size, randomly picked from a
maximum size. We chose 10, 60, and 300 s as the
timeout thresholds, and in most cases the veriﬁer cor-
rectly classiﬁed the AP as a non-rogue. Note that these
thresholds are quite conservative, and the longer the
threshold the more likely test packet size will appear in
normal AP trafﬁc (higher false positives). In practice,
1-s timeout is typically good enough since enterprise
network is usually sufﬁciently provisioned and long
delays are rare. Here the false positive rate (1 minus de-
tection rate) was low, though it increased as test packet
size and timeout threshold increased. This suggests that
smaller test packet size is desirable for better accuracy
and less network overhead.
Next we studied false negatives when a rogue AP is
reported as a non-rogue, which may happen as follows.
A sniffer receives instruction from the veriﬁer to start
monitoring test packets in the air. Before the test pack-
ets from the veriﬁer are relayed by the AP, however,
enough number of non-test packets from that AP has
led the sniffer to conclude the veriﬁcation reporting
that the AP is not a rogue. Thus the longer for the test
packets to reach the AP, the more likely the sniffer will
report the AP to be a non-rogue (false negatives).
Table 1 Accuracy of rogue AP veriﬁcation
Maximum size (bytes)
Timeout threshold 200 400 500 1000 1500
10 s 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
60 s 100% 100% 100% 99.5% 99%
300 s 99.5% 99% 99.5% 99% 99%Mobile Netw Appl
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Figure 16 shows the CDF of the needed time for
the binary hypothesis testing algorithm to terminate
reporting non-rogue using the residential trace. We
found that 10% of tests ﬁnished within 100 ms, which
means10%falsenegativesifittakestestpackets100ms
to reach target AP. However, almost 98.5% of tests
ﬁnished after 50 ms, which means 1.5% false negatives
if test packets arrive within 50 ms. The minimum ﬁnish
time of all tests was 20 ms. Since the enterprise network
delays are typically in the order of several milliseconds
orlessandthetrafﬁconarogueAPtendstobelight,we
do not expect high false negatives in real deployments.
IfarogueAPwasindeedclassiﬁedasanon-rogue(false
negatives), its veriﬁcation would expire after certain
time and would be tested again next time (Section 4).
7 Discussions
Our research is conducted within the context of project
MAP [12], in collaboration with Dartmouth College
and Aruba Networks. MAP aims to build a scal-
able measurementinfrastructure using wirelesssniffers,
based on which various online analysis algorithms are
designed to detect WLAN security threats. Our detec-
tor will be integrated with MAP as an independent
detector. Within MAP, we envision a building-wide
system deployment with 20–50 wireless sniffers and 1
rogue AP veriﬁer. Assume that there are 1,000 active
hosts in the building to be veriﬁed using 30 100-byte
test packets for each host, the imposed network load is
about 3 MB over a relatively long period. We do not
consider this load as a bottleneck, given that many or-
ganizations already run a scanner to periodically check
various properties of the internal hosts as part of their
security operations.
The veriﬁer, on the other hand, may have to handle
a large amount of trafﬁc generated inside the building.
While the processing is fairly lightweight (only check-
ing transport-layer header), there are ways to further
reduce the overhead. For example, many routers can
be conﬁgured to export NetFlow (or sFlow) records
marking the endpoints of the active ﬂows. The veriﬁer
can greatly increase its scalability by using this informa-
tion instead of parsing the whole packet streams. This
approach will also reduce some privacy concerns since
only IP addresses and port numbers are exposed to the
veriﬁer. The veriﬁer, in this case, need to randomly
select a TCP sequence number since NetFlow does
not provide this information. The probability of SN
collision, however, is relatively low given the large SN
range. We plan to investigate this tradeoff as a future
work.
Our approach has a potential limitation on detecting
the rogue APs conﬁgured as VPN endpoints, which will
drop the veriﬁer’s forged test packets since they do
not have valid authentication headers, thus the wireless
sniffers cannot see the test packets. Currently our solu-
tion is to have the veriﬁer to mark the IP addresses that
only have one communication peer (VPN tunneling
effect) and alert administrator for further checkup.
The rogue AP’s owner may try to block veriﬁcation
trafﬁc to avoid detection. Note that the veriﬁcation
trafﬁcs source headers are forged so it looks like from
a current communicating peer rather from the veriﬁer,
so the rogue AP cannot drop trafﬁc based on its source.
On the other hand, a rogue AP owner who is familiar
withouralgorithmmaystillbeabletoblockveriﬁcation
trafﬁc on his AP by following TCP behaviors and drop-
ping out-of-sequence TCP packets. However, he may
risk dropping real application data if veriﬁer chooses
sequence numbers very close to last transmitted packet.
Our solution can be easily combined with other
rogue AP detection methods. For example, a wireless
sniffer may ﬁrst try to associate with an open AP and
ping the internal veriﬁer. Our method only needs to
be activated when the association fails or the AP re-
quires authentication, to further reduce the veriﬁcation
overhead.
8 Conclusion
We propose a new method where a wired veriﬁer co-
ordinates with wireless sniffers to reliably detect unau-
thorized rogue APs. The veriﬁer sends test trafﬁc from
internal network to the wireless edge and reports the
address of conﬁrmed rogue AP for automatic blocking.Mobile Netw Appl
With trace-based simulations, we show that the veri-
ﬁer’s workload can be amortized over time when mon-
itoring a large number of active hosts. Using sequential
hypothesis testing theory, the veriﬁer sends a sequence
of test packets with a speciﬁc size so the sniffers can
verify the rogue AP that may have encrypted its trafﬁc.
In practice, our greedy sniffer channel scheduling algo-
rithm can quickly allocate sniffers to cover all suspect
APs.Ourempiricalresultsalsoshowsthatthedetection
algorithm is resilient on heavily congested channels and
is accurate on empirical AP traces.
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